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基于MUC的安全攸关系统危害识别方法

Hazard Identification Method of Safety Critical System Based on MUC
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摘要 安全攸关系统在工业领域应用广泛,其设计的首要任务是识别系统危害,而已有的危害识别方法在表达方式、创造力等方面存在局限性.本文基于误用例(Misuse case,简称MUC)提出了一种易用的系统危害识别方法,这种方法有助于系统工程师在系统需求阶段获取系统潜在危害.首先,根据系统功能得到MUC,然后,使用文本误用例(Textual Misuse case,简称TMUC)模板对每个MUC进行危害分析,最终,获得系统的潜在危害. The Safety-critical systems are widely used in industry. The first task of Safety-critical system design is to identify system hazards. However, the commonly used methods of system potential hazards identification have limitations in expression, creativity, etc. Based on the Misuse case(MUC), this article puts forward a kind of method of system hazard identification, which is easy to use. This approach helps system engineers to acquire system potential hazards in system requirements phase. First of all, you must acquire MUC based on the system function. Then, the textual misuse cases(TMUC) template is used to analysis the hazard of each MUC. Finally, the potential hazards in the system are obtained.
出处 《计算机系统应用》 2016年第3期257-261,共5页 Computer Systems & Applications
关键词 安全 危害 MUC TMUC safety hazard MUC TMUC
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