行政审批与地区腐败关联度——来自省际面板数据的实证研究发现

Correlations between Administrative Examination & Approval and Regional Corruption——An Empirical Analysis at the Chinese Provincial Level

在政府主导型经济发展模式下,行政审批扮演着公共部门对市场外部管制的主要角色,也一定程度上与寻租腐败紧密关联。本文利用1999-2012年间中国省级动态面板数据进行计量检验,重点考察行政审批对地区腐败水平的影响,为行政审批改革在反腐层面的必要性提供一定佐证。研究发现,行政审批与地区腐败程度具有双向影响,伴随审批事项的扩大,腐败水平也相应提高,应用联立方程组检验显示审批每增加1个标准差,将导致腐败程度增加0.016个标准差,同时地区腐败也将反向作用于行政审批,增加了削减审批的难度。这一结论对于我国正在大力推进的以简政放权为重点的行政审批改革具有特殊政策价值,基于此,需要进一步加大行政审批改革力度,通过政府自身内部体制创新,挤压和消除行政审批与寻租腐败之间的灰色空间。

The paper uses the provincial panel data in China from 1999 to 2012 to conduct an empirical test and investigate the effect of administrative examination approval at regional corruption level. Results show that it has two- way interaction between administrative examination approval and regional corruption level. The upward degree of administrative examination approval for every one standard deviation will lead to0. 016 standard deviations of regional corruption. Meanwhile,corruption also occurs for the reverse effect and adds the difficulty of approval abatement. Therefore,the Chinese government needs to make greater efforts to move administrative examination approval reform and correct distortion of the relationship within,so that it could maximize the elimination on the space and opportunity of rent- seeking corruption.