从“即”的概念探询“差异性”——以西田几多郎与牟宗三的思想比较为切入点

The Notion of “Difference” in Terms of Ji/Soku——Nishida Kitarō and Mou Zongsan

日本哲学家西田几多郎与中国哲学家牟宗三运用"即"这个概念来思考"差异性"的问题。西田的"场所"哲学,向读者展现出了"同一性"与"差异性"之间的一种踟蹰态度。有些京都学派成员就此指出,后期西田用"即"这个概念所表达的所谓"绝对矛盾的同一性",其实并非"同一性"的哲学理论,反而是"差异性"的存有论。类似的踟蹰态度也出现在牟宗三的论述中,不过这是以"作用层-存有层"区分的面貌出现的:牟氏继承圆教的洞见,用"即"这个概念去追求"矛盾的同一性",又用该概念去探索"作用层"与"存有层"之间的差异性。通过借鉴吉尔·德勒兹的"差异"理论并揭示西田与牟氏思想的深意,考虑到天台宗的思想传统孕育了东亚文化对于"差异性"问题的最深邃思考,我们可以认为,东亚哲学用"即"表现的存有论架构,实际上都源自天台宗。

This paper tries to clarify the theory of difference in terms of ji（＂即＂, soku） or soku that is developed by Nishida Kitaro and MouZongsan, comparing it with contemporary occidental Metaphysics of difference. It is known that Nishida＇s argument for bashoshows a kind of hesitation between identity and difference; several Kyoto philosophers, along with recent researchers, interpret Nishida＇s philosophy of ＂absolutely contradictory identity＂ in terms of soku as an ontology of not identity but of difference. A similarhesitation is seen in MouZongsan＇s metaphysical argument for the difference between the act- and being- stratums, which leads him to affirm the ＂identical＂ completeness of yuanjiao in terms ofji. I argue that these arguments become fully intelligible only as the result of their ontology of difference that strikingly resembles Deleuze＇s post-Heideggerian metaphysical attempt. This interpretation also shows how far their ontological speculation in terms ofji/soku owes to the heritage of East Asian Buddhism because the contradiction between identity and difference is most seriously explored in the Tiantaitradition.