腐败、经济寻租与公共支出结构——基于2007-2013年中国省级面板数据的分析

Corruption,Rent-seeking and Public Expenditure Structure:Based on China's Provincial Panel Data of 2007-2013

本文结合政治选举、私人部门经济活动主体行为特征和财政管理体制框架,采用二阶段寻租模型考察腐败影响公共支出结构的作用机制,发现腐败易于诱发降低公共服务性支出、增加公共购买和公共投资支出的财政资源配置倾向。基于2007-2013年中国省级面板数据,采用动态系统GMM估计方法的实证分析结果表明:腐败显著增加一般公共服务、城乡社区事务和教育的决算支出比重,反腐预期的提高将使这些领域的预算支出比重降低,这意味着上述领域已成为近年来财政腐败的易发领域。为避免腐败对公共支出结构的影响,应在加大反腐力度的情况下,进一步提高地方政府的财政自主程度,完善预算管理制度,提高中央政府专项转移支付资金的使用效率。

According to the framework of election process, behavior characteristics of private agent and fiscal management system, the paper uses two-stage rent-seeking model to investigate the mechanism of corruption motivation which distorts public expenditure structure, and finds that corruption is likely to reduce expenditure on public service and increase public purchase and investment expenditure. An empirical estimation with dynamic system GMM method based on China＇s provincial panel data of 2007-- 2013 indicates that corruption has significantly increased the share of expenditure on general public service, urban and rural community affairs, and education. Anti-corruption expectation will reduce the budget of those expenditures, which implies that these areas have become high incidence of corruption in recent years. Granting more financial autonomy to sub-national governments, perfecting budget management system, and improving the efficiency of special transfer payment from central government will contribute to avoiding the distorting effects of corruption on public expenditure structure.