摘要
研究了委托人与代理人双边过度自信倾向及风险厌恶偏好情形下的委托-代理问题.结论表明最优风险分担水平随着委托人风险厌恶程度及代理人过度自信水平的增大而增加,随着代理人风险厌恶程度和委托人过度自信水平的减少而减少.最优努力水平随代理人风险厌恶程度及委托人过度自信水平的增大而提高,随委托人风险厌恶程度和代理人过度自信水平的减少而减少.
In this paper,we study the principal-agent problem in the case of principal and agent bilateral overconfidence and risk aversion.The conclusions show that the optimal risksharing coefficient is an increasing function of the principal＇s risk aversion and the agents＇ overconfidence level,is a decreasing function of the agents＇ risk aversion and the principal＇s overconfidence level.The optimal level of effort is a decreasing function of the agents＇ risk aversion and principal＇s overconfidence level,is an increasing function of the principal＇s risk aversion and the agent＇s overconfidence level.
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
北大核心
2016年第5期45-51,共7页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基金
国家自然科学基金(71273048
71473036)
江苏高校哲学社会科学项目(2014SJB97)
江苏高校自然科学面上项目(12KJB63001)
中国博士后科学基金项目(2013M541576)
