超额现金持有、管理决断权与投资扭曲——财务柔性视角下剩余负债能力的影响效应研究

Excess Cash Holding,Managerial Discretion and Investment Distortion——The Effect of Spare Liability Capacity from the Perspective of Financial Flexibility Theory

本文基于财务柔性理论审视和分析投资扭曲行为的成因及其影响因素,引入管理决断权作为关键调节变量,重点考察在剩余负债能力不同时,管理决断权对超额现金持有与投资扭曲之间关系的影响效应有何差异。研究结果表明,企业有剩余负债能力时,管理决断权较大比管理决断权较小时,超额现金持有与投资扭曲之间表现出比总体更强的正相关关系;反之,无论管理决断权大小,超额现金持有与投资扭曲之间不存在显著的相关性。因此,超额现金持有与投资扭曲之间不再是传统代理理论演绎的线性正相关关系,财务柔性理论可以对此给出符合企业实际财务行为的合理解释,同时也明确了管理者在其中发挥的关键作用。

This paper surveys and analyzes the causes and influencing factors of investment distortion on the basis of financial flexibility theory. It introduces managerial discretion as a key adjustment variable and mainly investigates the difference of the effects of managerial discretion on the relationship between excess cash holding and investment distortion when the spare liability capacities are different. The research results indicate that when the enterprises have spare liability capacity and the managerial discretion is relatively large or small,a positive correlation that is stronger than the general level exists between excess cash holding and investment distortion. By contrast,no significant relevance exists between excess cash holding and investment distortion whether managerial discretion is big or small. Therefore,no positive linear correlation explained by traditional principal-agency theory exists between excess cash holding and investment distortion. Financial flexibility gives the reasonable explanation that is in line with enterprises' actual financial behaviors. Meanwhile,it clearly defines the key roles played by managers in it.