特大生产安全事故行政问责“分水岭”效应:基于问责立方的分析

The Logic of Blaming in Serious Mass Industrial Accidents of China: Analysis Based on the Accountability Cube Model

中国的行政问责遵循什么样的逻辑?基于官僚组织等级控制的视角,本文提出了理解当代中国行政问责的"问责立方"模型。借助于对2004-2014年47起特大生产安全事故行政问责对象的分析,本文检验了组织层级、责任结构、问责事由和管理关系对行政问责结果的影响。研究发现,问责对象所在的组织层级是影响事故问责后果的关键因素,责任结构、问责事由、管理关系影响较弱。这一研究发现表明,在上下分治的治理结构中,作为事故应对措施的问责呈现出"分水岭"效应:重度问责集中于行政组织的特定群体,这一群体的上级成员和下级成员则面临轻度问责的压力。特大事故问责隐含中央政府对决策主体和执行主体进行责任切割的逻辑。通过事故问责,中央政府可以将压力有效地转移到政策执行主体身上,从而激励地方政府更好地执行安全生产政策。

How to explain the logic of bureaucratic accountability as a response to Crisis in Chi- na？ Puzzles researchers focus on crisis management strategy nowadays. Based on the Cube Model this paper analyzed the accountability results of 48 Mass Serious Industrial Accidents in past decade. The statistics show that the position of one civil servant being blamed is the key factor to accountabil- ity while the role, causality play some importance. As a whole, the accountability process presents watershed at the level of county government. The central government tries to divide the decision- maker from policy-implementation, resulting in that few high officials were blamed above county lev- el. Applying accountability system, the central government reinforces the incentives to fundamental government agents.