摘要
文章通过构建基于公司资本结构理论的对外担保定价模型以及市场对担保的需求反映模型推理发现,负债比率更高的公司其提供的担保价格更低,绩效更差的公司担保价格更低,揭示担保供给方的定价策略导致购买资产负债率更高的企业所提供的担保更有利可图。模型揭示了在我国资本市场中,提供对外担保公司的资产负债率更高,经营绩效更差这一现象是由担保方定价策略及被担保方收益程度所定,并非是单纯的大股东对小股东的掏空行为。
The paper, by constructing a theoretical model on the mechanism of the price of loan guarantee from the aspects of both guarantors and debtors based on the theory of capital structure, finds that guarantors with higher leverage or worse perfor- mance provide loan guarantee with lower price, and therefore give more benefits to debtors without harming their own value. The model reveals the phenomenon that firms with higher leverage or worse performance are more likely to issue loan guaran- tees in China＇s capital market, which is determined by guarantors＇ pricing strategy and debtors＇ benefits but not tunneling.
出处
《华东经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第3期136-140,共5页
East China Economic Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71172186
71472148
71572144)
关键词
对外担保
财务特征
定价策略
loan guarantee
financial characteristics
pricing strategy
