不确定条件下P2P网贷平台运营与政府监管演化博弈稳定性分析

An Analysis of the Stability of Evolution Game between the Operation of P2P Lending Platform and the Supervision of Government under Uncertainty

本文在博弈双方收益大小不完全确定的框架下,基于演化博弈的思想并考虑P2P网贷平台与政府监管两大博弈群体的有限理性特征,建立不完全信息P2P网络借贷行业中平台与政府两大群体非对称演化博弈的动态复制系统,分析系统在不同情形下的演化稳定状态,以期为P2P网贷行业运营与监管的长期演化趋势做出更为真实和准确的预测。研究表明:在不同的参数取值条件下,随着对方行为策略的不断调整,系统将趋向于不同的均衡状态或周期振荡状态,此结论可为P2P行业监管部门监管政策与奖惩机制的设计提供一定依据。

Using the framework in which both utility are not completely determined, and considering limited rationality characteristics of P2P lending platform and government supervision, the paper establishes non symmetric evolutionary game dynamic replication system of incomplete P2P lending platform and government based on Evolutionary Game Theo- ry. Then it analyzes and explains the system＇s evolutionary stable state under different circumstances, which can make accurate prediction of the long-term evolution trend for government supervision. Research shows that, with the adjustment of the opponent＇s behavior strategies, the system will tend to different equilibrium state or periodic oscillation state under different parameter conditions. The research conclusion can provide certain basis of reward and punishment mechanisms for the government.