权力效应与经理报酬:基于隐藏行为视角的解释

Power Effect and Manager Compensation: An Interpretation based on the Perspective of Hidden Action

在公司治理框架下,经理有动机且可以利用所掌握的权力对其报酬水平施加影响。由于败德行为成本的约束,领导权理论认为经理并不会公然地采取操纵行为,而是将某些操纵报酬行为隐藏起来。从败德行为成本视角出发,本文对经理隐藏行为的具体模式与内在动因进行分析,以厘清当前在经理报酬领域中存在的一些困惑之处,以期为完善公司治理机制、特别是经理报酬决定机制提供参考。

Managers can influence the compensation structure and level of their own on behalf using the power in hand under the corporate governance mechanism. Sometimes hidden actions exist in their controlling procedure because of out- rage costs. This paper discusses the models and reasons of hidden actions in manipulating executive compensation by use of outrage costs to explain many puzzles in field of executive compensation. The discussion also gives some useful advices and strategies for improving the corporate governance mechanism, especially for the executive compensation setting and adjusting mechanism.