考虑投资努力的总承包工程建设利润分配模型

Profit Distribution Model of General Contracting Construction Considering Investment Degree

以总承包工程建设中的总承包商和采办服务商为研究对象,考虑他们为获得更多的工程项目收益各自采取措施改善自身管理绩效实现节余项目预算资金。假设节余预算的比例为双方努力水平连续递增的凹函数,以收益共享理论和Stackelberg博弈思想为基础,建立总承包商和采办服务商的收益分配模型,分别研究了联合体情况下和分散决策情况下各自的最优决策问题,其中分散决策时分析得出项目预算节余资金在总承包商与采办服务商之间的最优分配比例,同时导出相关推论。通过算例分析了模型中各主要参数的变化对最优策略的影响来验证分析结果。

This paper sets up a profit distribution model between the general contractor and the procurement service provider assuming that they can reduce project cost to obtain profits by effective investment. By applying revenue sharing and Stackelberg game,the paper studies the optimal decision under the centralized situation and the decentralized situation respectively assuming that the reduced cost is one concave function with their investment degrees. And the best distribution ratio is deduced between the general contractor and the procurement service provider under the decentralized situation. Finally,a numerical example and sensitivity analysis are presented to illustrate the model,and some managerial implications are also provided.