摘要
运用委托代理理论,分析了公私合作PPP模式下,农业节水灌溉工程的设施边界和服务边界的失谐原因。提出了治理边界失谐的"退出壁垒"规制路径,并以PPP契约为载体,考虑契约的不完备性,从私人投资激励和农民利益保护两个方面,分析了退出壁垒的机制效率问题。建立和求解了柔性退出壁垒治理模型,并运用数值仿真分析。研究结果表明:最优退出规制水平受到合作双方的项目相对评价水平、成本优劣势、项目非公共化程度的影响。
Using the Principal- agent Theory,we analyzed the boundary detuning reason between facilities and service of agricultural water- saving irrigation project under the PPP mode,and put forward the regulations of "exit barriers" path to governance the boundary mismatch detuning. Considering the incomplete contract from two aspects of the private investment incentives and protect the interests of farmers,we analyzed the mechanism and efficiency problem of exit barriers,established and solved the governance model of flexible exit barriers,and simulated the numerical analysis. The results show that for the both cooperaed sides their relative evaluation level,the cost of the project,the advantages and disadvantages in the project of the degree of public impacted the level of optimal exit regulation commonly.
出处
《干旱区资源与环境》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2016年第3期182-188,共7页
Journal of Arid Land Resources and Environment
基金
天津市教委社会科学重大资助项目(项目编号:2012ZD32)
国家自然科学基金项目(项目编号:71272017)资助