摘要
为了分析回收宣传对回收渠道的影响,首先构建了回收宣传下的回收数量函数,其次,建立了处理商与回收商博弈模型。基于此模型,不仅研究了回收宣传对单位直接/间接回收价格、回收数量及利润的影响,还通过对比分析两部收费契约、成本分摊契约及约束间接回收价格的成本分摊契约,研究了逆向供应链的协调机制。研究得到:回收宣传虽然使单位直接/间接回收价格降低,但是却增加废旧产品回收数量和回收利润;两部收费契约、成本分摊契约不能使供应链达到协调,约束间接回收价格的成本分摊契约可以使供应链达到协调。
This paper first constructed recovery function based on recycling propaganda in order to analysis the im- pact of recycling propaganda on recycling channels before building the game model between recycling processors and recyclers. The impact of recycling propaganda on the unit direct/indirect recycling prices, the recycling amount and profit were not only studied, but also the supply chain coordination was studied through comparing two fee contracts, cost-sharing contracts and constraint sharing contract of indirect cost recovery price. The result is as follows: although recycling propaganda could make the unit direct/indirect recycling prices lower, it could increase the recycling amount and profit; two fee contracts and cost-sharing contracts cannot achieve the supply chain coordi- nation, however, constraint sharing contract of indirect cost recovery price could make the supply chain to achieve the coordination.
出处
《科技与管理》
2016年第1期1-8,共8页
Science-Technology and Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71320107006)
国家自然科学基金青年基金和面上项目(71473029
71103024)
关键词
处理商
回收商
协调机制
博弈模型
recycling processors
recyclers
coordination mechanism
game model