基于团体贷款的小微企业集群融资:理论与实证

Theoretical and Empirical Study on SMEs Cluster Financing Based on Group Lending

以往文献认为集群融资是解决小微企业融资难问题的重要途径。本文根据信息不对称理论,通过将现有两人两期团体贷款博弈模型(Okura&Zhang,2012)拓展到三人模型。研究发现,与个人责任贷款相比,团体贷款借款人的工作努力水平与还贷率随着项目收益、个人责任偿付部分等变量值的变化而变化,一定条件下其借款人工作努力水平与还贷率较个人责任贷款的更高,而另一定情况下则反之。基于县域小微企业信贷数据进行实证研究发现,集群融资能够提高企业信贷可得,但在贷款利率和信贷风险方面并不存在明显的优势,验证了模型的判断。

Cluster financing is considered to be an important way to solve SMEs financing difficulty in previous literature. According to Asymmetric Information Theory, this paper improves the two period group lending model （Okura ＆ Zhang, 2012）, and finds that group lending＇s individual hard work level and repayment probability change over project benefits and some other variable compared with personal lending, however group lending is not always in a dominant position. This paper al- so collects SMEs credit data in a county for empirical study. We show that duster financing can increase SMEs loan amount, when it doesn＇t have a distinct advantage in lending rate and credit risk. We should design a framework which can overcome the moral hazard to lead financing institutions and enterprises efficiently and properly.