利维坦假说、财政分权与政府规模扩张——基于中国彩票收入的省际面板数据

The Leviathan Hypothesis,Fiscal Decentralization and Government Expansion——Evidence from China's Lottery Provincial Panel Data

借助拉弗曲线来构建地方政府彩票销售行为模型,通过对中国30个省、直辖市、自治区2000-2012年的省际数据进行面板回归检验模型设定的合宜性,并利用实证检验的结果分析利维坦假说在中国的有效性。实证结果表明,中国政府的彩票销售行为以追求收入规模最大化为目标,部分省份在追求彩票收入最大化的同时不幸进入了"拉弗禁区"。同时,财政分权对政府彩票收入的影响呈非负向的变动关系,这与"财政分权与政府规模反向变化"的利维坦假说结论不一致。

This essay uses the Laffer curve to build up and test the lottery revenue maximization model with the evidence from China＇s provincial panel data from 2000 to 2012,and then analyzes the effectiveness of Leviathan theory in China according to the empirical results. The empirical results show as follows： Revenue maximization is the target of governments ＇ lottery behavior,and some provinces have caught in the Laffer paradox while pursuing this target. Fiscal decentralization is not negatively relative to the lottery revenue of the government,which disagrees with the Leviathan hypothesis.