零售商纵向持股对制造商直销渠道选择的影响

The Effect of Retailer's Vertical Sharing on Supplier's Launching Direct Channels

用博弈论建立单渠道和双渠道供应链决策模型,得到Bertrand均衡的制造商和零售商最优利润及消费者福利。研究发现:无论制造商生产成本如何,当零售商对制造商持股比例较小时,直销渠道增加制造商利润但侵蚀零售商利润;当零售商持股比例适中时,直销渠道实现了零售商和制造商双赢;当零售商持股比例较大时,制造商不开通直销渠道。但在双渠道中,若生产成本为线性,制造商降低批发价格;若生产成本为非线性,当零售商持股比例较小时,制造商提高批发价格;当零售商持股比例较大时,制造商降低批发价格。此外直销渠道总是增加消费者福利。

Based on a supply chain consisting of a retailer and a supplier,this paper analyzes the supplier encroachment with retailer vertical sharing for supplier. Result showes that,if the proportion of the retailer for supplier was small,the retailer suffered,namely the ＂win-lose＂outcomes; the retailer could benefit from encroachment when the retailer holds moderate shares for supplier,namely the＂win-win＂outcomes. However,if the retailer held more shares for supplier,the supplier did not launch the direct channel. What was the different,if the cost of supplier was linear,the supplier lowered wholesale price; the supplier raised wholesale price when the supplier showed diseconomy and the retailer holds less shares; the supplier lowered wholesale price when the supplier showed diseconomy but the retailer held more shares. In addition,consumers always benefit only if the supplier launched the direct channel.