摘要
用博弈论建立单渠道和双渠道供应链决策模型,得到Bertrand均衡的制造商和零售商最优利润及消费者福利。研究发现:无论制造商生产成本如何,当零售商对制造商持股比例较小时,直销渠道增加制造商利润但侵蚀零售商利润;当零售商持股比例适中时,直销渠道实现了零售商和制造商双赢;当零售商持股比例较大时,制造商不开通直销渠道。但在双渠道中,若生产成本为线性,制造商降低批发价格;若生产成本为非线性,当零售商持股比例较小时,制造商提高批发价格;当零售商持股比例较大时,制造商降低批发价格。此外直销渠道总是增加消费者福利。
Based on a supply chain consisting of a retailer and a supplier,this paper analyzes the supplier encroachment with retailer vertical sharing for supplier. Result showes that,if the proportion of the retailer for supplier was small,the retailer suffered,namely the "win-lose"outcomes; the retailer could benefit from encroachment when the retailer holds moderate shares for supplier,namely the"win-win"outcomes. However,if the retailer held more shares for supplier,the supplier did not launch the direct channel. What was the different,if the cost of supplier was linear,the supplier lowered wholesale price; the supplier raised wholesale price when the supplier showed diseconomy and the retailer holds less shares; the supplier lowered wholesale price when the supplier showed diseconomy but the retailer held more shares. In addition,consumers always benefit only if the supplier launched the direct channel.
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第3期130-135,共6页
Soft Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70871125
70902019)
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(10YJC630183)