基于转移支付契约的两级供应链低碳减排博弈分析

Two-stage Supply Chain Game of Low-Carbon Emission Reduction Based on Transfer Payment Contract

在碳排放问题全球化的背景下,为了更好地实现低碳减排,假设消费者具有低碳偏好,政府对非减排企业征收碳税并对减排企业进行转移支付,且转移支付额度与低碳减排效率呈正相关的情况下,研究了单一供应商和制造商的两级供应链低碳减排问题。在Stackelberg博弈模型下,运用逆向求解法和利润最大化原则,求解得出供应链企业的最优决策组合、最优减排量、最优产量和利润,最后通过数值模拟方法检验模型在实践中的应用。结果表明:政府可以通过制定相应的碳税和合理的转移支付契约,实现供应链的联合减排,并促进供应链企业的低碳研发,从而改善市场失灵,恢复市场的自我调节功能。该研究可为政府制定低碳减排的宏观调控政策提供理论依据。

Under the background of globalization on carbon emissions,in order to implement low-carbon emission reduction,this paper studies the low-carbon emission reduction problems of the two-stage supply chain including single suppliers and manufacturers with the assumption that consumers have a low-carbon preference,governments take a carbon tax on the non-emission reduction enterprises,emission-reduction enterprises can receive transfer payments,and the subsidies are positively correlated with reduction efficiency.Based on the Stackelberg game model,using the converse solution method and the profit maximization principle,the paper gets portfolio decisions of the optimal reduction,production and profits for the supply chain enterprises.At last,the paper tests the model application in practice through numerical simulation.The results show that the government can formulate corresponding carbon tax and reasonable transfer payment contract to not only realize supply chain＇s joint reduction,but also promote the supply chain enterprises＇ research on low-carbon development,and accordingly improve the market failure and restore selfregulation function of the market.The study can provide a theoretical basis for governments＇ macro-control policies on low-carbon emission reduction.