家族化管理、两权分离与会计稳健性

Family Management,Ownership and Management Separation and Accounting Conservatism

家族上市公司中，实际控制人或其他家族成员参与管理与否影响到两类代理问题和会计信息供求，从而影响会计稳健性。本文基于2008～2012年间A股家族上市公司数据，探讨家族化管理对会计稳健性的影响。研究发现，在家族化管理的情景下，会计稳健性相对较低，且家族化管理程度越高，会计稳健性越低。进一步检验发现，两权分离能显著弱化家族化管理程度较弱一方对会计稳健性的正向促进作用。结论证明了家族企业治理模式中高管职业化制度推行的重要性与必须性，同时也为中国公司治理领域高管激励与约束、职业经理人市场的完善提供了借鉴意义。

In family listed companies, the actual controller or other family members involved in the management or not affects the two agency problems which further affects the supply and demand of accounting information and influences the accounting conservatism. By observing the data of A-share listed family company from the year 2008 to 2012, this paper investigates the effect of family management on the accounting conservatism. The results indicate that accounting conservatism is lower under the situation of family management, and the higher degree of family management, the lower degree of the accounting conservatism. Further examination finds that throughthe moderating effect exerted by separation of owning and managing, it can significantly weaken the positive promoting effect of lower family management on accounting conservatism. This conclusion proves that the importance and necessity of professional managers in family firms, and also provides the reference for the managers＇ incentive and constraint and perfection for the professional manager market of corporate governance.