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车载自组织网络激励机制研究

Research on the Incentive Mechanism of Vehicular Ad Hoc Network
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摘要 车载自组织网络以车辆为基本信息单元,由于车辆节点属于不同的私人用户或者不同的组织,车辆会因主观因素表现出自私性,导致网络中大量的数据包不能到达目的地,由此给网络性能带来很大影响。为解决车辆节点间的合作问题,提出一种基于节点活跃度的激励机制,并通过建立吞吐率和时延模型进行性能分析,能够真正地对网络中的自私节点起到激励的作用,有效降低时延,提高吞吐比率。 Vehicular Ad Hoc network takes vehicle as the basic information unit, however, the vehicle nodes in vehicular networks belong to private different users or different organizations, therefore, the vehicle will show selfish out of subjective factor, resulting in network large amounts of packets which cannot arrive at the destination, thus the network performance brought great adverse influence. In order to solve the problem of vehicle cooperation between nodes, proposes a method based on node active index incentive mechanism, and makes perfor-mance analysis through the establishment of throughput and delay model, which haves the real incentive effect on the network of selfish nodes, effectively reduces the delay and increasing the throughput ratio.
作者 周永 岳志鹏
出处 《现代计算机》 2016年第5期47-52,共6页 Modern Computer
关键词 车载自组织网络 节点活跃度 激励机制 自私节点 Vehicular Ad Hoc Network Node Active Index Incentive Mechanisms Selfish Node
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