摘要
在考虑渠道间比价行为下,构造了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的两阶段Stackelberg博弈模型,求得了制造商与零售商竞争时的最优策略和利润。研究结论表明:随着比价消费者比例的增加,网络渠道的销售价格与服务水平增加,传统零售渠道的销售价格下降,制造商的最优利润增加,零售商的最优利润减少,供应链整体利润呈递增的规律;当市场全覆盖时,零售商的最优决策是不提供服务。
Considering the price comparison behavior between dual channels,the two-stage Stackelberg game model built is composed of a manufacturer and a retailer,which obtains the optimal pricing strategy and profits when they compete.Research results show that with the increase of the ratio of price comparison consumers,the network channel’s sales price and service level increases,while the traditional retail channel’s is decreasing,the manufacturer’s optimal profit increases while the retailer’s is reducing,at the same time,the whole optimal profit of the supply chain increases.When the market covers all,the retailer’s optimal decision is no service-providing.
出处
《工业工程与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第1期23-28,共6页
Industrial Engineering and Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71471102)
