产权视域内部控制与大股东掏空行为抑制

Internal Control and the Tunneling——A Theoretical Analysis Based on Property Rights View

大股东掏空行为抑制是投资者利益保护的核心问题。本文基于产权视角,剖析控制权安排与掏空行为关系,结合制度困境以及契约不完备观点,提出内部控制分层控制观点,认为在抑制大股东掏空行为时,重点抑制那些缺少社会资本接近或补偿的大股东,构建社会域嵌入的内部控制分析框架,为内部控制经验研究提供新的理论方向。

The tunneling of controlling shareholder is the core problem in the field of investor protection. This paper, fo- cuses on property rights aspect, analyzes the theoretical model between property rights and institutional environment to study the institutional default of residual control rights. Combining with the incomplete contract theory, this paper proposes hierarchy view- point of internal control. When planning to restrain the tunneling of controlling shareholder, we should focus on restraining those controlling shareholder who are lack of the opportunity to get in touch with the social capital. At the end, this paper construcsts the internal control theoretical framework to expand our future research.