中国银行业资本监管新规的激励相容特性研究

Research on the Incentive Compatibility of New Capital Regulations in China

全球金融监管倡导激励相容,强调金融机构自身目标与监管者目标协调一致。在分析中国银行业资本监管新规激励相容特征的基础上,对商业银行"三性"目标与监管机构目标的激励相容程度进行测算,运用GMM方法对资本监管目标与商业银行目标模型进行检验,发现资本监管目标与商业银行盈利性目标并不冲突,而且银行自身持有资本的意愿能够降低风险行为,但是资本充足率监管对于流动性的影响并不显著。可见,当前中国银行业资本监管整体上具有激励相容特性,但在流动性和风险性方面激励程度有待加强。

The global financial supervision attaches great importance to the incentive compatibility,and the harmony of the targets between the financial institution and its supervisor.On the basis of analyzing the incentive compatibility of the new capital regulations,this paper provides a quantitative gauge of the incentive compatibility degree between the＂SPL＂targets of the commercial banks and the new capital regulations,and then develops a regression by GMM to empirically study the incentive compatibility of both targets.The findings indicate that capital regulation target is not in conflict with the commercial banks＇ profitability target,the bank＇s own willingness of holding capital can reduce the risk,but the capital adequacy regulation does not have significant influence to the liquidity target.So,the Chinese current capital regulations are highly positive incentive on a whole,but the incentive level of liquidity supervision needs to be strengthened.