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公募债券融资、关系型承销与会计稳健性 被引量:2

Public Bond Financing,Relationship Underwriting and Accounting Conservatism
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摘要 基于我国公募债券市场,本文考察了主承销商与发债企业建立的业务合作关系(我们称之为关系型承销)与会计稳健性之间的替代作用。我们选取2008年至2014年我国非金融上市企业的1917笔公募债券融资数据,实证研究发现:关系型承销与会计稳健性之间具有替代作用,即关系型承销水平越高的发债企业,其会计稳健性越低;与非国有企业相比,关系型承销与会计稳健性的替代作用在国有企业更强。结果表明,在公募债券市场,关系型承销和会计稳健性都可以视为债权人的利益保护机制,关系型承销降低了对发债企业会计稳健性的需求,而且这种现象在国有企业更为明显。本研究从关系型承销的角度补充了有关会计稳健性的替代机制的理论成果。 This paper examines the substitute effect between relationship underwriting and accounting conservatism in China' s public bond market. Using a sample of 1917 bond-year observations of non-financial firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets during 2008 ~ 2014 period, we find there is a substitute effect between relationship under- writing and public bond issuers' accounting conservatism. That is, finns with higher relationship underwriting have lower accounting conservatism. Furthermore, this effect tends to be more. significant in the state-owned firms than that in the non-state-owned firms. These results suggest that in China' s public bond market, both relationship underwriting and accounting conservatism can protect the interest of bondholders. Relationship underwriting reduces the demand for con- servative accounting of public bond issuers, and this effect is more obvious in the state-owned finns. Our study extends the research on the substitute effect of accounting conservatism based on studying the relationship underwriting between public bond issuers and their underwriters.
出处 《预测》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第2期29-36,共8页 Forecasting
基金 国家自然科学基金青年资助项目(71202043) 教育部人文社科西部和边疆地区青年资助项目(14XJC790001)
关键词 公募债券融资 关系型承销 会计稳健性 国有企业 public bond financing relationship underwriting accounting conservatism state-owned firms
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