公平关切及风险规避下知识型员工激励机制及改进模型

Incentive Mechanism for Knowledge Workers with Fairness Concern and Risk Aversion and Its Improved Model

本文采用博弈论中的委托代理模型研究了信息对称及不对称情况下企业对同时具有公平关切及风险规避心理特性知识型员工的激励机制问题,并提出一种改进模型降低企业代理成本。研究结果表明:信息对称时,激励机制与风险规避无关,企业效用与公平关切负相关;信息不对称时,员工努力、企业激励程度及收益与风险规避和公平关切均相关。采用"标尺竞争"机制可以有效节约企业代理成本,并且节约的代理成本与员工公平关切负相关。

In this paper, enterprises＇ incentive mechanism, with symmetric and asymmetric information respectively, for workers with psychological traits like fairness concern and risk aversion is studied in view of the principal-agent model of game theory, and an improved model is proposed to lower enterprises＇ agency cost. The results show that： With sym- metric information, incentive mechanism has no correlation with risk aversion, and income of enterprises is negatively correlated to fairness concern; while with asymmetric information, workers＇ effort level, enterprises＇ incentive degree and earnings are positively correlated to the degree of workers＇ fairness concern and risk aversion. It is further suggested that yardstick competition in incentive meChanism can effectively save agency cost while the saved agency cost has nega- tive correlation with workers＇ fairness concern.