考虑受让企业谈判势力的技术转移定价研究

The Study of Technology Transfer Pricing when Considering Negotiating Power of Transferee

针对技术转移过程中受让企业具有谈判势力的情况,本文构建了三阶段动态博弈模型,考察了谈判势力条件下的最优技术转移定价决策问题,并分析了谈判势力对最优技术转移定价合约以及市场均衡结果的影响。研究发现:谈判势力增强会降低大型受让企业的提成费和一次性授权费。而且谈判势力具有传导效应,即大型受让企业的谈判势力会影响没有谈判势力的小型受让企业的技术转移定价合约,使得小型受让企业的提成费随谈判势力的增强而降低,一次性授权费却随谈判势力的增强而上升。此外,谈判势力的增强还会降低市场中产品的价格,提高消费者福利。本文通过算例验证了基本结论,并分析了大型受让企业潜在市场需求以及产品差异化程度变化对结论的影响。

For the situation that the transferee has negotiating power in the process of technology transfer, this paper studies the optimal technology transfer pricing decision of R＆D firm and analyses the impacts of negotiating power on the optimal technology transfer pricing contracts and equilibrium outcomes by developing a three-stage dynamic game model. The study finds that the royalties and licensing fees of lager transferee will reduce with negotiating power of lager transferee. We also find that negotiating power has transmission effects, in other words, the optimal technology transfer pricing contract of small transferee will also be affected by lager transferee＇ s negotiating power. The royalties paid by small transferee will reduce with lager transferee＇ s negotiating power, but the licensing fees will increase. Moreover, the retail price in the market will decline and welfare of consumers will increase with negotiating power. Finally. numerical examples are used to verify the conclusions of this paper and to explore the impacts of parameter variations on the main conclusions.