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信息不对称、团体信用与农地抵押贷款——基于同心模式的分析 被引量:33

Asymmetric Information,Group Lending and the LCURs-Based Mortgage Loan: A Case of Tongxin County,Ningxia Province
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摘要 本文以同心模式为研究对象,分析了土地承包经营权抵押贷款的运行机制。系统梳理了同心模式的运作过程,并刻画了该模式的典型特征,在此基础上,从信用社的定价策略与合作社的治理机制两方面深入剖析了同心模式的运作机理。研究表明,同心模式采取了抵押与贷款相分离的融资机制及"农地抵押+团体贷款"复合型担保措施,通过组建融资中介、实施复合抵押、推动市场整合显著改善了普通农户的土地抵押信贷配给。同心信用社的统一定价和信贷配给是基于信息不对称的策略选择;合作社将团体信用应用于内部治理意在明晰连带责任与共有信用的产权,从而促进团体间竞争,降低合作社监督及执行合约的费用。 This paper explored the mechanism of the Land Contractual and Use Rights( LCURs) based mortgage loans with the case of Tongxin. After a systematicand concisely summarizing on thetypicaltraits of Tongxin model,this paper dived deep into the mechanism of it from analyzing the pricing strategy of credit cooperatives and the governance mechanism of cooperatives for LCURs transfer. It showed that the disconnect-type financing mechanism of mortgage loan and composite guarantee of LCURML with group lending were employed in Tongxin model,and by forming local financial intermediary,implementing compound mortgage,and integrating official and non-official financial markets,this model had profoundly improved the credit rationing of peasants. Meanwhile,the combination of unitary price and credit quota are the rational choice of credit cooperatives under asymmetric information. Moreover,subdividing CLCURT into couples of lending group is to clarify the property rights of joint liability and common credit for saving monitoring costs and executing costs of CLCURT.
出处 《农业经济问题》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第3期61-71,111,共11页 Issues in Agricultural Economy
基金 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目"农村资产管理与社区治理"(编号:KYZ201130) 江苏省普通高校学术学位研究生科研创新计划项目"产权管制下农地抵押贷款机制设计研究"(编号:KYZZ_0161) 南京审计学院人才引进项目(编号:NSRC15019)
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