逻辑必然性及其“面孔”——蒯因、普特南到戴蒙德的实用主义进路

Logical Necessity and Its “Face”— A Pragmatist Approach from Quine,Putnam to Diamond

作为新实用主义的序幕之一,蒯因对"经验主义两个教条"的批判,使"逻辑必然性"这一概念失去了先验基础。与此同时,如何在形而上学领域之外奠定逻辑必然性,也成为当代实用主义哲学的一个迫切诉求。普特南在20世纪90年代提出的一种"概念图式说",代表了这一诉求的一种典型形式;然而通过分析,可以发现其中仍然隐藏着一种隐秘的形而上学,或可称为寻求保障的形而上学,它是理解逻辑必然性的根本障碍。戴蒙德根据维特根斯坦对"面孔"的论述,启示出一种"面孔说",它有助于我们克服寻求保障的形而上学,了解逻辑必然性独特的确立方式。这样一种理解方式有别于蒯因和普特南的理论,是实用主义进路的新展开。

As one of the preludes to the ＂new pragmatism＂, W. V. Quine＇s criticism to the ＂two dogmas of empiricism＂ immediately deprives the concept ＂logical necessity＂ of its a priori foundation. Meanwhile, locating logical necessity outside the metaphysical realm also turns to be an urgent appeal of contemporary pragmatist philosophy. A ＂concept-scheme theory＂ proposed by Hilary Putnam in 1990s can be seen as a typical form of this appeal. However, through analyses, we can find an implicit metaphysics that might be named as metaphysics of pursuing guarantee in his theory. And this metaphysics proves to be an essential obstacle to the adequate understanding of logical necessity. Edified by Wittgenstein＇s relevant discussions, Cora Diamond enlightens a ＂face theory＂, which can help us overcome the metaphysics of pursuing guarantee and understand the special form of the establishment of logical necessity. Although it is different from the particular theories of Quine and Putnam, this approach does not contradict the basic spirits of pragmatism.