期权激励与管理层择机:中国的经验证据

Stock Options and Management Timing:Evidence from China

文章实证检验了上市公司在实施股票期权激励中管理层的择机行为。研究发现:(1)区间定价样本择机授予期权以降低行权价格;(2)区间定价样本与单日定价样本在定价基准日之后均择机披露利好消息以提高期权价值;(3)当管理层权力较大、公司治理水平较低、最终控制人性质为国有时,管理层同时发生择机授予期权与择机披露信息行为的概率较高,而无形资产占比和公司规模则会降低管理层同时发生以上两种择机行为的概率。文章的研究结论丰富和拓展了已有文献对管理层择机行为的研究成果,而且对于有效推行管理层期权激励计划以及抑制管理层择机行为具有重要的现实意义。

This paper empirically tests management timing in the listed companies when the mangers are awarded stock options.It comes to the results as follows：firstly,interval pricing samples award the management timing stock options to reduce exercise prices;secondly,interval and daily pricing samples have timing good information disclosure after the pricing benchmark date to increase the value of stock options;thirdly,with large power of the management,lower-degree corporate governance and state-owned ultimate controllers,the probability of simultaneous timing stock options and information disclosure by the management is higher and the proportion of intangible assets firm size reduce the probability abovementioned.It enriches and extends existing management timing research,and is of great significance to effective promotion of management stock options plan and the inhibition on management timing behavior.