董事会特征、资源松弛性与环境绩效:制造业上市公司的实证分析

Corporate Board Characteristics,Resource Slackness and Environmental Performance:Empirical Study from Chinese Listed Manufacturing Companies

企业环境绩效是环境战略及其执行的结果,董事会在公司内部治理机制中处于核心地位,董事会对环境战略制定、执行监督负直接责任,因此,董事会特征与环境绩效密切相关。基于代理理论,利用740家制造业上市公司2008~2010年的数据,对董事会特征与环境绩效之间的关系进行了实证分析。研究结果表明,董事会独立性、连锁性、规模对环境绩效有正面影响,而与西方发达国家的研究结论相反,董事会持股对环境绩效有负面影响。另外,虽然资源松弛性与环境绩效之间的关系错综复杂,但是研究发现,资源松弛性能够增强董事会连锁性对环境绩效的正面影响。证实了董事会在我国企业环境治理中的重要性,为企业环境治理和政府相关政策制定提供了理论基础。

Environmental performance results from corporate environmental strategy and its enforcement.At the pivotal position of corporate governance mechanism,board of directors is necessarily responsible for environmental strategy and monitoring its enforcement.Thus,board characteristics are linked closely with environmental performance.Drawing on agency theory and using the Chinese listed manufacturing companies in 2008-2010 as the sample,we empirically explore the relationship between board characteristics and environmental performance.The results show that board independence,interlock and size are positively correlated with environmental performance,and contrary to that found in western developed countries,board ownership is in negative association with environmental performance.Furthermore,although resource slackness is in a complex relationship with environmental performance,we find that resource slackness strengthens the effect of board interlock on environmental performance.These findings confirm the important role played by corporate board in environmentalmanagement,and provide a theoretical foundation for the practice of corporate environmental governance and governments＇ environmental regulation.