摘要
环境污染问题已成为制约我国经济社会可持续发展的桎梏,而政府管制是解决环境外部性问题的重要手段,它与企业环境污染有一个博弈过程。通过构建一个简单的博弈模型发现,负向激励机制和正向激励机制均能提高企业参与环境治理的积极性并降低政府的管制压力,但是过多使用前者会加剧社会不公平,过多使用后者会占用财政预算资金。建议完善正负向相结合的环境治理激励机制,加大企业污染信息披露,提高环保资金使用效率。
Environmental pollution has become a shackle which constrained to sustainable development of China's economic and social. Government regulation is an important means to solve the problem of environmental externalities. Government envi- ronmental regulation and enterprise environmental pollution is a game process. Through constructing a simple game model, it is found that negative incentive mechanism and positive incentive mechanism can improve enthusiasm of enterprises to partici- pate in environmental governance and reduce government's regulatory pressure, but excessive use of the former will aggravate social injustice, excessive use of the latter will occupy budget funds. Proposed to improve positive and negative to combination of environmental governance incentives, increase corporate pollution information disclosure, and improve efficiency of using en- vironmental protection funds.
出处
《湖北经济学院学报》
2016年第2期81-86,共6页
Journal of Hubei University of Economics
关键词
博弈论
环境治理
激励机制
game theory
environmental governance
incentive mechanism