分析师覆盖与盈余管理——来自中国上市公司的证据

Analysts Coverage and Earnins Management:Evidence from China's Listed Firms

本文以2003到2012年之间中国沪深A股上市公司为样本研究证券分析师对上市公司盈余管理决策的影响。我们发现分析师在盈余管理过程中扮演着外部监管者的角色,分析师覆盖人数更多的公司的盈余管理更少且更难达到盈余目标。研究同时发现分析师的监管作用是由虚增利润(可操控应计项目为正)的公司驱动的,分析师对虚减利润(可操控应计项目为负)的公司的监管作用不显著。通过使用工具变量解决潜在内生性问题后,我们发现上述结果是稳健的。

This paper studies the impact of security analysts on earnings management in listed firm, using China＇ s Shanghai ＆ Shenzen A share listed firms as an example. We find analysts play a role of outside regulators, and firms with more analysts coverage manage less earnings and more often miss their earnings target. Our results also show that the regulatory effect is mainly driven by income increasing （positive discretionary accruals） firms, while the regulatory effect on income decreasing （negative discretionary accruals） firms is not significant. Further, this paper utilizes instrumental variables to alleviate potential endogeneity problem and get robust results.