板块倒置、声誉机制与股利政策

Differences between Boards, Reputation Mechanism and Dividend Policy

基于非正式制度安排的声誉机制视角,分析了中国证券市场股利支付的板块倒置现象及内在机理。研究发现,成长性较高的公司出于未来再融资的需要,通过现金分红建立良好的声誉。经验证据表明,中小板和创业板市场的现金股利支付力度均高于主板市场,而且,中小板和创业板上市公司成长性越高,现金股利支付力度越大。此外,中小板和创业板上市公司通过股票股利传递未来发展信息。本研究为声誉机制在投资者保护弱化国家中的股利分配提供了经验证据,也为监管层改善和提高上市公司股利支付提供了政策依据。

Based on reputation mechanism from informal institutions, the paper analyses the inversion of dividend payout from Chinese securities market. It is founded that the high growth companies want to come to the capital market and raise funds in the future, and hence need to establish a reputation by cash dividend. Empirical evidence suggests that cash dividend payout ra- tios of SME Board and GEM Board are higher than that of Main Board. Besides, High growth companies of SME Board and GEM Board have higher dividend payout ratios than low growth companies. Stock dividend of SME Board and GEM Board sends a signal of future development. It provides empirical evidence in weak investor protection countries where reputation plays an important role in dividend payout and also provides policy proof for regulator to improve dividend payout.