摘要
通过构建运输业官民博弈演化模型,选取宋代运输业官民关系逐步恶化的案例进行经济学分析和验证,揭示中国古代运输业官民关系博弈演化规律。官方一向有动力不断扩大运输业公共部门、加大运输业投资、增加管制强度、干预和挤压民间运输主体的正常经营收益。而巨大的社会成本转移给底层组织和底层民众,逐渐激化社会矛盾形成对体系的负向激励和瓦解力量,成为历代运输业官民关系变化的制度原因。历代运输业官民关系恶化的教训对当前我国运输业的发展与体制改革具有重要启示作用。
With an economic analysis of the deteriorating government-people relationship in transport industry in Song dynasty,this paper reveals the evolutionary law of the government-people relationship in transport industry based on a Game Evolutionary model.The government is constantly motivated to expand transport public sectors,increase the investment,strengthen the management,and decrease the profits of nongovernmental transportation subjects.The cost is then transferred to the underclass organizations and individuals,which gradually intensifies the social contradictions and negative incentives and disintegrates the industrial system.This is the institutional cause of the changing government-people relationship in transport industry in the past dynasties,which is enlightening to the current structural reform and development of our transportation system.
出处
《北京交通大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第2期28-35,共8页
Journal of Beijing Jiaotong University(Social Sciences Edition)
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"基于交通/物流时间价值的经济时空关系研究"(41171113)
关键词
运输业
官民关系
博弈演化模型
宋代历史
transport industry
government-people relationship
Game Evolutionary model
the history of Song dynasty