从风险管理视角论商业银行高管薪酬改革

A Study on the Reform of Commercial Bank Executive Pay from the Perspective of Risk Management

通过选取16家上市商业银行2008年-2013年的数据,建立面板数据模型对我国商业银行高管薪酬与银行风险之间的相关性进行实证分析。结果发现,银行高管薪酬与衡量银行风险的不良贷款率之间呈正相关关系,我国银行业可能存在对高管过度激励的现象。因此,推行高管薪酬体制改革,建立完善的高管考核指标体系,加强风险管理,对商业银行的持续稳定经营至关重要。

By investigating the data of 16 listed banks in 2008-2013,this paper establishes a panel data model to make an empirical analysis on the correlation between executive pay and the risk of commercial banks in China.The results prove a positive correlation between the executive pay and non-performing loan ratio,which indicates excessive incentives for executives in China＇s banking industry.Therefore,this paper proposes that it is critical for the commercial banks to reform the implementation of executive pay system and to establish an assessment index system and strengthen the risk management in order to guarantee the stable and sustainable business.