分层董事会制度与公司价值——基于公司章程的视角

Classified Board Provisions and Firm Value:From the Perspective of Company Charter

关于分层董事会制度与公司价值的关系,学界尚没有一致结论。利用2006—2012年中国A股上市公司的数据实证检验了分层董事会制度影响公司价值的作用机制。研究结果同时支持了"堑壕假说"和"谈判收益假说",具体表现为:(1)分层董事会制度增加了公司的隐性代理成本,这种情况在大股东持股比例越高的公司表现更加明显;(2)分层董事会制度降低了目标公司被并购的概率,削弱了控制权市场的惩戒作用;(3)分层董事会制度增加了并购溢价,一定程度上提高了并购的谈判收益。以上研究结论为公司治理制度选择以及监管部门加强对公司的监管,提供了很有价值的依据。

The relationship between classified boards and firm value remains uncertain. Based on the data derived from China＇s A-share listed companies for the period from 2006 to 2012,empirical studies examine the mechanisms through which classified boards affect firm value. The evidence supports both the ＂managerial entrenchment hypothesis＂and the＂bargaining hypothesis＂. The main results are as follows： Firstly,classified boards increase implicit agent costs,and further research has found that the percentage of shareholding by the largest shareholder has a significant positive moderating influence on classified board provisions and implicit agent costs. Secondly,the establishment of classified boards results in a decrease of the probability of takeover and weakens the disciplinary threats of the takeover market. Lastly,classified boards can increase takeover premiums due to the ＂bargaining effect＂. From the perspective of company charter,the conclusions provide empirical evidence for the designing of corporate governance systems and for the reinforcement of the supervision of companies.