不同主体土地承包经营权抵押贷款模式选择的博弈分析

GAME ANALYSIS ON THE CHOICE OF MORTGAGE MODE OF LAND CONTRACT AND MANAGEMENT RIGHT FOR DIFFERENT SUBJECTS

农村土地承包经营权抵押贷款工作已进入试点实施阶段,如何从供给侧入手由最合适的金融机构以最有效方式满足不同规模经营主体的融资需求,成为我们必须理清的一个根本前提。以博弈论为工具,对银行、农民合作社、新型农村合作性金融组织和不同经营规模的农户等利益相关方,在不同约束条件下的博弈行为进行了分析。结果表明,中小农户在当前农村合作性金融组织缺失的条件下,应采取"间接型"抵押模式申请贷款,但在合作性金融组织成立后则应采取直接型模式向其申请贷款;而对大型农业经营者而言,其最佳融资模式始终是直接型融资。

The work of mortgage loan for rural land contract and management right has entered the pilot implementation phase. How to meet the financing needs of different scale business entities starting from the supply side by the most suitable financial institutions in the most effective way has become a fundamental premise that must be sorted out. The thesis uses the game theory as a tool to analyze the game behavior of such stakeholders as the banks,farmers＇ cooperatives,the new typed rural cooperative financial organizations and farmers with the different scale of operation under different constraints. The results show that the small and medium-sized farmers should take the ‘indirect＇mortgage model to apply for loans under the current situation when there is shortage of rural cooperative financial organizations. However,after the establishment of the cooperative financial organizations,they should take the direct mode to apply for the loan. And for large agricultural operators,the best financing model is direct financing.