摘要
长期以来,分析国际货币与金融体系时(IMFS),学者们更关注经常账户,鲜有研究资本账户。无论是正式的模型分析,还是描述性历史分析,皆是如此。当全球金融市场高度分割时,这种研究方法可能是合理的。但是,在全球金融市场高度一体化情形下,这种分析方法的缺陷就非常明显,因为19世纪下半叶以来的大多数时间里全球金融市场高度关联。资本账户"零和"使得关注点由从商品市场转向资产市场和资产负债表。从这个角度来看,IMFS会变得不同。IMFS最大的缺陷在于其放大了金融繁荣与衰退的倾向,由此产生巨大的金融危机,即所谓的"过度金融弹性"。评估IMFS潜在脆弱性,必须跨越支撑国际收支统计的居民/非居民的分类,从跨越国家边界的决策单位(银行、非金融公司)的并表层面进行分析。为此,本文回顾了历史上两个严重金融危机的表现,分别是两次世界大战之间与最近金融危机时期。
In analysing the performance of the intemational monetary and financial system (IMFS), too much attention has been paid to the current account and far too little to the capital account. This is true of both formal analytical models and historical narratives. This approach may be reasonable when financial markets are highly segmented. But it is badly inadequate when they are closely integrated, as they have been most of the time since at least the second half of the 19th century. Zeroing on the capital account shifts the focus from the goods markets to asset markets and balance sheets. Seen through this lens, the IMFS looks quite different. Its main weakness is its propensity to amplify financial surges and collapses that generate cosily financial crises - its "excess financial elasticity" . And assessing the vulnerabilities it hides requires going beyond the residencen-resident distinction that underpins the balance of payments to look at the consolidated balance sheets of the decision units that straddle national borders, be these banks or non-financial companies. We illustrate these points by revisiting two defining historical phases in which financial meltdowns figured prominently, the interwar years and the more recent Great Financial Crisis.
出处
《金融监管研究》
2016年第1期43-63,共21页
Financial Regulation Research