博弈视角下政府污染减排补贴政策选择的研究

Analysis on the Policy Choice of Pollution Abatement Subsidies from the Perspective of Game Theory

当前,围绕节能减排的补贴政策已广泛被各国政府采用,而不同的补贴政策可能在减排效果、产品产量及价格影响上存在差异。有鉴于此,本文在博弈的视角下,重点研究了价格补贴与研发补贴的污染减排效果差异。结果表明:政府的价格补贴在降低本国最终产品产量的同时增加了外国最终产品的产量,从而能够有效降低本国的污染排放,但将导致外国的污染排放出现较小幅度的增加,而研发补贴则将同等降低本国和外国的污染排放量。相比较而言,本国价格补贴比研发补贴对减少本国污染排放量的作用更为有效。此外,本文还发现了最优补贴水平受到污染税率等因素影响的事实。

Economic globalization has strengthened the links between countries, making other countries＇ response and countermeasures should be taken into consideration while formulating pollution abatement policy. Meanwhile, subsidies have been widely adopted by the governments to reduce pollutant emissions, but the effects of abatement subsidies are different in abatement effect, product output and price. Based on the perspective of game theory, this paper studies the differences between price subsidies and R＆D subsidies in pollution abatement effects. The results show that price subsidies tend to decrease domestic output of final product while increasing foreign output of final products, so domestic pollution emissions can get reduced effectively and foreign pollution emissions get increased in a small range. R＆D subsidies can reduce both domestic and foreign pollution emissions equally. In comparison, price subsidies are more effective than R＆D subsidies in reducing domestic pollution emissions. Besides, this paper also finds that the optimal subsidy level is also influenced by other factors such as pollution tax rate.