随机需求环境下零售商联合采购与合并运输联盟的稳定性分析

Stability of retailers' coalition with collaborative procurement and shipment consolidation under stochastic demand

在随机需求环境下,企业为了降低运作成本,会进行联合采购与合并运输的战略合作,但是,为了维持所形成合作联盟的稳定性,必须公平合理地分摊联盟的总运作成本.文章采用合作博弈论中的核概念,对随机需求环境下零售商联合采购与合并运输联盟的稳定性展开了分析.1在需求随机到达的情形下,得到了零售商联合采购与合并运输联盟的最优订货策略;2指出零售商进行联合采购与合并运输的战略并不一定总能降低联盟的总期望运作成本,由此提出了零售商合作能降低总期望运作成本的条件;3在可降低总期望运作成本的条件下,提出了按边际成本进行分摊的规则可使大联盟保持稳定,并通过一个具体的实例对成本分摊方案进行了说明.

In order to reduce operating cost, companies will form coalitions which adopt strategies of collabora- tive procurement and shipment consolidation under stochastic demand. However, they have to allocate the oper- ational cost fairly and rationally to keep the stability of coalition. This paper uses cooperative game to analyze the stability of retailers＇ coalition with collaborative procurement and shipment consolidation under stochastic de- mand. First of all, we get the optimal order quantities of the coalition. Then, we show that the cooperation of purehasement and shipment will not always reduce the total operating costs, we give the conditions under which the cooperation will be better for all members. Lastly, we provide that a cost allocation rule for the case that fol- lows from each retailer＇s marginal cost will keep the grand coalition stability.