摘要
P2P网贷已经成为小企业融资的新型渠道,对弥补我国中小企业融资有效供给不足具有重要意义。本文以Lending Club的数据为基础,建立信息不对称理论模型,剖析P2P网贷缓解信贷配给的机制以及存在的逆向选择风险。借鉴美国JOBS监管新规,建议对P2P小企业网贷实施功能性监管,建立包含平台主体法律地位、投融资限额、信息披露要求和投资者保护的全面监管框架。
P2P lending has become a new channel and important supplementary for small business financing. Based on the loan-level data from Lending Club, this paper built model of asymmetric information to analyze the mechanism of P2P Lending to ease credit rationing and the adverse selection risk of P2P Lending. By drawing new regulatory rules of JOBS, we advise to implement the function regulation for P2P Lending and develop comprehensive regulatory framework for legal status of P2P Lending, investment and financing quotas, information disclosure requirement and investor protection.
出处
《现代财经(天津财经大学学报)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第4期44-53,共10页
Modern Finance and Economics:Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目(11YJC790303)
国家社会科学基金青年项目(12CJY106)