摘要
互联网的开放性、匿名性特点,使得政府在应对网络舆情传播时面临高度的不确定性。本研究使用不完全信息动态博弈理论,模拟政府和网民之间的舆情信息博弈过程,建立了舆情信息博弈模型。该模型引入了网民的个人认知能力和社会信息共享程度等因素,描述网民在每一次博弈中修正对政府行为的判断并做出自己的最优选择,预测政府干预网络舆情的最佳时机,最后运用Net Logo计算机软件对此模型进行仿真,验证了模型的有效性和可靠性。仿真结果表明:突发事件的社会信息共享程度和网民的认知能力对舆情信息的发展、走向起着至关重要的作用,所以突发事件发生后政府应果断介入,发布权威信息尽早引导网民,掌控舆情信息的传播方向。
Due to the openness and anonymity of the internet, the government faces a high degree of uncertainty when responding to the public opinion on the internet. In this paper, we simulate a game process of public opinion information between government and the cyber citizens, and establish the infornmtion game model of public opinion based on incomplete infnrnlation dynamic game theory. This model considers the factors like the eyber citizens" personal cognitive ability and the sharing degree of the social information and describes how the cyber citizens in every game adjust their judgment of the government's behavior and make their own optimal choice, which help to decide the best time for government to interfere in the network public opinion. Finally, this paper verifies the validity and reliability of the model by simulating this model with the software NetLogo. The sinmlation shows that the information sharing degree of the emergency and cognitive ability of the cyber citizens play a vital role in the development of the public information. So the government should intervene decisively after the emergency comes into being and should release the authoritative information as soon as possible in order to guide the cyber citizens and control the spread of the public opinion.
出处
《管理学刊》
2016年第2期43-49,共7页
Journal of Management
基金
江西省"十二五"规划项目(13TQ03)
江西省软科学研究计划项目(2014BBA10086)