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基于社会情境/建构代理视角的公司高管社会行为研究述评 被引量:2

A Literature Review of Social Behavior of Corporate Executives from the Perspectives of Socially Situated/Constituted Agencies
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摘要 公司高管行为及其引致的代理问题向来是公司治理研究的主题。传统代理理论因低度社会化导致经济学视角下的公司治理研究缺乏对公司高管社会行为的关注,公司治理社会学派通过研究社会互动和社会建构中的公司治理问题,衍生出社会情境代理和社会建构代理视角下的公司高管社会行为研究,进而推动公司治理研究从经济学视角向社会学视角的转换。本文基于社会情境代理和社会建构代理观点,阐述公司治理社会学派关于高管社会行为研究的现状,指出相关研究的不足,并做出未来研究展望,其中尤其强调以本土化和边界拓展为途径进行理论创新的可能性。本文为基于组织社会心理学视角的行为公司治理研究提供了有价值的思想启发和资料参考。 Corporate executive behavior and resulting agency problems have always been the topics of corporate governance research. Owing to low-degree socialization, traditional agency theory results in a lack of attention to social behavior of corporate executives in corporate governance research from an economic perspective. And through the analysis of corporate governance issues based on social interaction and construction, sociological school in corporate governance research derives social behavior research of corporate executives from the perspectives of socially situated/constituted agencies, and then advances the transformation of corporate governance research from economic perspective to social perspective. Based on the viewpoints of socially situated and constituted agencies, this paper elaborates the research status on the behavior of corporate executives engaged by the sociological school of corporate governance research, then points out the shortcomings and future research prospects of related research topics, and particularly places emphasis on the possibility of theory innovation approached by localization and boundary-expanding. It provides some valuable inspirations and references for behavioral corporate governance research from the perspective of organizational social psychology.
出处 《外国经济与管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第4期3-18,共16页 Foreign Economics & Management
基金 国家自然科学基金面上项目(71272184) 国家自然科学基金重点项目(71533002) 教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目(15JJD630002)
关键词 高管社会行为 社会情境代理 社会建构代理 行为公司治理 social behavior oI executives socially situated agency socially constituted agency behavioral corporate governance
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参考文献48

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二级参考文献70

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