期刊文献+

反垄断执行中罚款与损害赔偿的协调机制——我国与欧盟的比较分析 被引量:1

原文传递
导出
摘要 在反垄断私人诉讼领域,一个重要的价值目标就是威慑,特别是反垄断损害赔偿诉讼。除了损害赔偿和定罪率,公共执行和私人执行都面临着错误的成本,或者因预期处罚偏低而导致个人选择从事违法行为,或者因预期处罚过高而产生过度威慑进而抑制有效的商业行为。为了实现最优化的执行,错误成本也是重要考量因素之一。
作者 剌森
机构地区 德国汉堡大学
出处 《法律适用》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第4期117-120,F0003,共5页 Journal of Law Application
  • 相关文献

参考文献19

  • 1See Warren F. Schwartz, "An Overview of the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement", 68 Geo. L. J. (1979-1980), pp.1082-1083.
  • 2Roger J. Van den Bergh, Peter D. Camesasca, (eds.), European Competition Law and Economics: A omparative Perspective, Inter- sentia nv, 2001, pp.307.
  • 3See John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande, "Cartel Overcharge and Optimal Cartel Fines", in 3 Issues in Competition Law and Policy 2203 (ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2008), pp.2215.
  • 4See John M. Connor, Yuliya Bolotova, "Cartel Overcharges: Survey and Meta-Analysis", International Journal of Industrial Organi- zation 24.6(2006), pp.1134.
  • 5See John M. Connor,C. Gustav Helmers, "Statistics on Modern Private International Cartels", AAI Working Paper No. 07-01, pp.38.
  • 6See Florian Smuda, "Cartel Overcharges and the Deterrent Effect of EU Competition Law",Journal of Competition Law & Eco- nomics, 10( 1 ) ,2013 ,pp.85.
  • 7http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf.
  • 8Roger J. Van den Bergh, Peter D. Camesasca, European Competition Law and Economics: A omparative Perspective, (eds.), Inter- sentia nv, 2001, pp.315-316.
  • 9See Catherine Craycraft, Joseph L. Craycraft, Joseph C, Gallo, "Antitrust Sanctions and a Firm's Ability to Pay", Review of In- dustrial Organization 12, 1997, pp.181-182.
  • 10Joaquln Almunia, Janusz Lewandowski, "Information Note of Inability to pay under paragraph 35 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines and payment conditions pre- and post-decision finding an infringement and imposing fines", SEC(2010) 737/2, Brussel, 12 June 2010.

引证文献1

二级引证文献10

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部