摘要
《新财富》分析师评选是卖方分析师行业的重要外部激励机制,其有效性对证券市场信息效率有重要意义。本文研究分析师发布信息的质量与评选结果的关系,从而探讨该激励机制的有效性。本文发现:在评选前,获奖分析师发布信息的质量,与未获奖分析师无显著差异;分析师获奖概率与分析师的曝光率及所属机构的市场地位正相关,但与分析师发布信息的质量无关。本文结果暴露出当前分析师行业外部激励的一些不足,这应引起证券市场的关注与反思。
In the sell-side analyst industry,analyst ranking is an important external incentive mechanism.We study the relationship between the ranking results and the quality of information released by sell-side analysts.We find that the quality of information released by star analysts＇is not better than that of non-star analysts before ranking and the probability of becoming star analysts is positively correlated to their popularity and the market status of the brokerage house of analysts,instead of the quality of the information released by analysts.We conclude that analyst ranking is not as effective as an external incentive currently,which is worth our attention and reflection.
出处
《经济学（季刊）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第1期723-744,共22页
China Economic Quarterly
基金
中央财经大学金融学院2015年度青年教师科研启动项目成果
中央财经大学科研创新团队支持计划
中央财经大学青年教师发展基金的资金资助
关键词
明星分析师
激励有效性
分析师信息质量
star analyst
incentive effectiveness
information quality of analyst
