声誉激励、声誉惩罚与公司业绩

Reputation Incentive, Reputation Punishment and Corporate Performance

利用2010-2013年中国451家经理人未发生变更的上市公司平衡面板数据,考察经理人声誉激励与声誉惩罚的治理有效性。研究发现:与公司业绩改善带来的声誉激励预期相比,经理人对公司业绩恶化引起的声誉惩罚预期更敏感;初始声誉水平影响经理人对公司业绩变动的声誉预期,声誉越高的经理人对声誉惩罚越敏感;所有权性质也影响经理人对公司业绩变动的声誉预期,与国有企业相比,非国有企业经理人对声誉惩罚更敏感。由此研究认为,当前提高我国上市公司经理人声誉治理有效性的现实选择是声誉惩罚,为了更好发挥声誉惩罚的治理有效性可以通过对经理人进行"声誉俘获"等方式来实现。

By making use of the balanced panel data from 451 China＇s listed companies whose managers have not changed from 2010 to 2013, this paper explores the effectiveness of corporate gov- ernance of reputation incentive and reputation punishment on the managers. The results show that compared to the expected reputation incentive brought by the improvement of company performance, managers are more sensitive to the expected reputation punishment caused by the deterioration of company performance. The initial reputation level would affect the reputation expectation from the changes of corporate performance; the higher the reputation of the manager, the more sensitive to the reputation punishment. The nature of ownership would also affect the manager＇s reputation expectation from the changes of corporate performance; compared with the state-owned enterprises, managers of non state-owned enterprises are more sensitive to the reputation punishment. Thus, this study believes that the reputation penalty is currently the practical choice for China＇s listed companies to improve the ef- fectiveness of managers＇ reputation governance. In order to give better play to the governance effective- ness of the reputation penalty, such methods as ＂reputation capture＂ can be adopted for the managers.