并购绩效与政企关联——基于我国上市公司的实证研究

Performance of mergers and acquisitions and government-enterprise relationship: an empirical study on listed companies in China

并购重组作为企业扩张与改革的方式受到越来越多的重视。以我国2011—2013年发生并购行为的上市公司为样本,通过对比研究法和因子分析法相结合的方式,从盈利、每股指标、偿债、运营四个方面对公司并购前后的绩效进行评价,并从政企关联角度出发,研究政企关联对并购绩效的影响。结果表明,政企关联与企业并购绩效负相关,且政企关联强度越大,并购绩效越差。指出政企关联在一定程度上会导致资源的错误配置,降低并购后资源整合的效率,旨在为政府"掠夺之手"理论提供支持。

As the way of enterprise expansion and reform,mergers and acquisitions has been paid more and more attention. Taking a sample of listing companies with mergers and acquisitions in China from 2011 to2013,through the method combined with comparative study and factor analysis,the performance of sampled companies before and after merger and acquisition is evaluated from the aspects of profitability,solvency,debt service,operation,from the perspective of relationship between government and enterprises; the effect of merger and acquisition performance from the relationship between government and enterprise is studied.The result shows that the relationship between government and enterprises was negatively correlated with the merger and acquisition performance,and the greater the intensity of relationship between government and enterprise is,the worse the merger and acquisition performance is. It is proposed that the relationship between government and enterprises will lead to the wrong allocation of resources to a certain extent,reduce the efficiency of resource integration after merger and acquisition. That can provide support to the ＂predatory hand＂theory of government.