公司内部晋升机制及其作用——来自公司人事数据的实证证据

Promotions within the Firm:Empirical Evidence from a Personnel Data

本文利用一家中国公司2000～2012年的人事数据探讨了公司内部晋升机制以及晋升的激励效应，对著名的锦标赛理论进行了系统且深入的实证检验。首先，我们用数据证实公司内部晋升取决于员工之间产出的相对排序，低职级员工的竞争者更可能来自于同一部门，而高职级员工面临的竞争对手则更可能来自全公司范围同一职级的员工。其次，我们发现晋升是员工职业生涯中工资增长的重要来源，职级晋升对工资增长的贡献在17％～39％之间。最后，我们还发现晋升奖励对员工有激励作用：晋升奖励越大，员工产出越高。不仅如此，晋升激励与产出的相关性还会随产出波动的增加以及岗位开放程度的加大而有所减弱。另外，本文实证分析还表明晋升奖励高的部门，员工产出整体偏高，且竞争激烈，部门产出方差小。

By taking advantage of the personnel data in 2000~2012 from a Chinese firm, we explore the promotion mechanism within the firm and the incentive effect of promotions on employees,and we carried out a systematic and in-depth empirical test of the famous tournament theory. Firstly, our data confirmed that promotion depends on workers' relative performance. The tournament competition of employees at low job levels happens within the department, while competitors of high level workers are more likely to be those at the same level from all over the firm. Secondly, we show that promotions contribute a lot to employees' wage growth. A promotion would increase the wage by 17%~39%. Finally, we document that the wage spread in the promotion has the incentive effect on employees: workers' performance is positively related to the wage spread in the promotion. What's more, such positive relation will be weakened with the increase of fluctuation of position output and the degree of opening to outside labor market. In addition, the departments with higher wage spread in the promotion will have more output and the variance of outputwill be smaller if the competition is more intense.