绿色耐用产品的节能补贴合同设计

Designenergy-saving subsidy contract for green durable product

通过建立"政府-企业-消费者"三阶段的博弈模型来研究节能补贴政策对绿色产品设计的作用机理,并给出了政府在两个目标(最大化单位产品节能指数或最大化总节能指数)下节能补贴合同的最优设计.此外,论文还分析了企业利润和消费者剩余总量在两种合同下的差异,结果表明:当补贴预算较低时,两种目标下的最优合同是一致的,此时企业和消费者并没有从节能补贴政策中获利;在最大化总节能指数的目标下,当补贴预算较高时,企业和消费者皆从节能补贴政策中获利.

The paper models the effect of the energy-saving subsidy for a firm and consumers with a three-stage game. The aim is to design the optimal subsidy contract for improving the energy-saving attribute per product and total energy-saving attribute respectively. Moreover, this paper studies the optimal energy subsidy con- tract＇ s effect on the firm ＇ s profit and consumer surplus. Here are two main results ： When the government in- vests rarely, the optimal energy-saving subsidy contracts under the two objectives are the same, and the con- sumers and thefirm obtain no improvement from them; When the government aims to improve the total energy- saving attribute and its investment is sufficiently large, the firm＇ s profit and the consumer surplus increases under the optimal contract the government adopts.