决策信息心理加工、认知偏差与国有企业CEO职务舞弊行为

Psychological processing of decision-making information,cognitive bias and CEO's corrupt conduct

本文将"有限理性假设"作为研究的逻辑起点,通过采用决策信息的心理加工过程分析CEO职务舞弊的决策行为,探索相关心理因素所引致的控制虚幻认知偏差、短视认知偏差和参照依赖认知偏差对于国有企业CEO职务舞弊行为的作用机理。进一步,将认知偏差的作用机理作为CEO职务舞弊控制策略的微观心理基础,通过提高反舞弊机制与国有企业CEO心理规律的契合程度,修正原有制度人性化的缺失,提出了建立舞弊审查委员会制度、独立董事行业协会制度和高管廉政账户制度等职务舞弊控制策略。

This paper studies how the mental factors of control illusory cognitive bias,short-sighted cognitive bias andreference dependent cognitive bias affect CEO's corrupt conduct in state-owned enterprises by analyzing thepsychological processing of decision-making information in their corrupt conduct. Taking mechanism of cogni-tive bias as the micro psychological basis of control strategy of corrupt conduct,this paper offers suggestions in-cluding anti-fraud information committee system and independent director industry association system whichcan help prevent the fraud of CEO in state-owned enterprises more efficiently.