“僵尸企业”诱因与处置方略被引量：88

Incentives and Disposal of “Zombie Enterprise”

下载PDF

导出

摘要运用Logit模型对我国"僵尸企业"形成因素进行分析,结果表明:高负债企业、规模过大企业、制造业企业和国有企业较易成为"僵尸企业",运营效率低是造成能源开采与制造行业企业成为"僵尸企业"的主要原因。针对债务重组和破产重整两种"僵尸企业",应采取不同的应对策略。处置"僵尸企业"应从完善法律法规、推动债务重组、安置失业人员、解决过剩产能等方面着手。 According to the analysis of factors on ＂zombie enterprise＂ with logit model, we find that firms with high debt, large firms, manufacturing firms and state-owned firms are prone to be ＂zombie enterprise＂. The results also show that low operating efficiency is the main reason of turning into ＂zombie enterprise＂ in energy exploitation and manufacturing industries. For debt restructuring and bankruptcy reorganization ＇s ＂zombie enterprise＂, different tactics should be used. Many aspects, such as the improvement of law and regulation, promoting debt restructuring,resettlement of unemployed workers and resolving excess capacity, should be considered when disposing ＂zombie enterprise＂.

作者朱舜楠陈琛

机构地区清华大学创新发展研究院中山大学岭南学院

出处《改革》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第3期110-119,共10页 Reform

关键词 “僵尸企业” 企业重组企业发展 zombie enterprise restructuring of the enterprise enterprise development

分类号 F275 [经济管理—企业管理]

引文网络
相关文献

参考文献8

1Hoshi, T.. Economics of the Living Dead. The Japanese Economic Review, 2006, (1) : pp.30- 49.
2Ahearne, A. and Economic G., Shinada, N.. Zombie Firms Stagnation in Japan. International Economics 8d Economic Policy, 2005, (2):pp.363- 381.
3Caballero, R. J., Hoshi T., Kashyap, A. K.. Zombie Lending and Depressed Restricting in Japan. The American Economic Review,2008, (5) :pp.1943-1977.
4Fukuda, S. I., Nakamura, J. I.. Why did "Zom- bie" Firms Recover in Japan. World Economy, 2011, (7) :pp.1124-1137.
5Dewatripont, M., Maskin, E.. Contract Renego- tiation in Models of Asymmetric Information. Eu- ropean Economic Review, 1990, (2/3):pp.311 - 321.
6Hart, O. Moore, J.. Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy, 1990, (6) :pp.1119-1158.
7Shibate, T., Tian, Y.. Debt Reorganization Strategies with Complete Verification under In- formation Asymmetry. International Review of E- conomics & Finance, 2012, (1) : pp. 141-160.
8宋淑琴,臧紫薇.财务状况、债务重组与公司绩效——基于债务重组“输血”抑或“造血”的实证分析[J].财经问题研究,2014(11):79-86. 被引量：15

二级参考文献16

1李心福.上市公司债务重组财务效应研究[J].北京工商大学学报（社会科学版）,2007,22(6):53-56. 被引量：18
2Dewatripont, M. , Maskin, E. Contract Renegotiation in Models of Asymmetric Information [ J ]. European Economic Review, 1990,34(2/3) : 311-321.
3Hart, O. , Moore,J. Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm [ J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1990,98 (6):1119- 1158.
4Huang, J. C. , Huang, C. S. The Effects of Bank Relationships on Firm Private Debt Restructuring: Evidence from an Emerging Market [ J ]. Research in International Business and Finance, 2011,25 ( 1 ) : 113-125.
5Polsiri, P. , Sitthipongpanich, T. Bank Connections and Corporate Restructurings : Evidence from Thailand [ J ]. International Research Journal of Finance and Economics ,2012,83 ( 3 ) : 1450-2887.
6Shibata, T., Tian, Y. Debt Reorganization Strategies with Complete Verification under Information Asymmetry [J]. International Review of Economics & Finance,2012,22( 1 ) : 141-160.
7lnoue, K. , Kato, H. K. ,Bremer, M. Corporate Restructuring in Japan: Who Monitors the Monitor? [ J ]. Journal of Banking & Finance,2008,32(12) : 2628-2635.
8Jostarndt, P. , Sautner, Z. Out-of-Court Restructuring versus Formal Bankruptcy in a Non-Interventionist Bankruptcy Setting [ J ]. The Review of Finance,2010,14 (4) : 623-646.
9Lev, B. , Thiagarajan, S. R. Fundamental Information Analysis [ J ]. Journal of Accounting Research, 1993,31 ( 2 ) : 190- 215.
10Quirin, J. J. , Allen, A. , Mendoza, C. Q. The Effect of Earnings Permanence on Fundamental Information Analysis [ J ]. The Mid-Atlantic Journal of Business,2000,36(4) : 149-173.